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Implicit Contracts, Unemployment, and Labor Market Segmentation
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We analyze the impact of imperfect contract enforcement on the emergence of 
unemployment. In an experimental labor market where trading parties can form long-term 
employment relationships, we compare a work environment where effort is observable, but 
not verifiable to a situation where explicit contracts are feasible. Our main result shows that 
unemployment is much higher when third-party contract enforcement is absent. 
Unemployment is involuntary, being caused by firms’ employment and contracting policy. 
Moreover, we show that implicit contracting can lead to a segmentation of the labor market. 
Firms in both segments earn similar profits, but workers in the secondary sector face much 
less favorable conditions than their counterparts in primary-sector jobs. 
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Many employment relationships are characterized by contractual incompleteness. Probably
the most important reason for leaving contracts incomplete is the diﬃculty to monitor and
verify employee performance or work eﬀort. When this is the case, ﬁrms cannot stipulate
fully contingent contracts but have to rely on other, implicit means to elicit work eﬀort. Sev-
eral such implicit contract enforcement mechanisms have been discussed in the literature,
ranging from voluntary bonus payments to self-enforcing relational contracts based on an
implicit threat to dismiss workers who have been caught shirking (e.g., MacLeod and Mal-
comson 1989, Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1992, MacLeod and Malcomson 1998). Other
papers have argued that social preferences can generate the implicit incentives necessary
to overcome moral hazard problems. Workers who feel treated fairly, e.g., because their
employer generously shares the rents from production, might voluntarily provide high work
eﬀort in return (Akerlof 1982, Fehr, G¨ achter, and Kirchsteiger 1997).
While implicit contracts can provide strong performance incentives, they are potentially
detrimental to the labor market as a whole. In particular, implicit contracting can give rise
to involuntary unemployment. Firms might ﬁnd it optimal to dismiss workers rather than to
cut wages in times of economic downturns if they fear adverse reactions to pay cuts (Bewley
1999). The requirement to pay strictly positive rents to workers can also render less produc-
tive jobs unproﬁtable and therefore lead to job rationing. Finally, unemployment could itself
be a prerequisite to encourage eﬀort provision of employed workers. Higher unemployment
increases the cost of job losses since, c.p., the job acquisition rate for unemployed workers
decreases. Thus, unemployment has been argued to provide performance incentives for em-
ployed workers who want to avoid losing their jobs (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984, MacLeod and
Malcomson 1989).
In this paper, we empirically analyze the relationship between the degree to which con-
tracts are explicitly enforceable and the emergence of unemployment. In order to identify
the causal impact of contract enforcement on the level of unemployment, we implement an
experimental labor market where we exogenously vary the veriﬁability of work eﬀort. In the
market, ﬁrms and workers interact during multiple market periods. All ﬁrms share the same
1production technology which exhibits decreasing returns to scale from labor, but ensures
that full employment is technologically eﬃcient. In our main treatment (IC treatment),
ﬁrms can observe but not verify their workers’ eﬀort. Firms thus have to rely on implicit
incentives to elicit work eﬀort. In a control treatment, concluded contracts are explicitly
enforced; i.e., a worker’s eﬀort must be equal to the contractually agreed upon eﬀort level (C
treatment). In other words, eﬀort is veriﬁable and there is no contract enforcement problem
in this treatment.
Our main result shows that the absence of third party contract enforcement has a dra-
matic impact on the level of unemployment. While there is virtually zero unemployment
when contracts are explicitly enforced, unemployment is much higher when the contract-
ing parties have to rely on implicit performance incentives. We show that the diﬀerence in
unemployment is attributable to diﬀerences in how labor markets function under explicit
and implicit contract enforcement. When third party contract enforcement is not feasible,
ﬁrms rely on a mixture of instruments to generate implicit performance incentives. They
pay strictly positive rents to their workers, and many ﬁrms try to build up long-term em-
ployment relations. In such relational contracts, high-performing workers are rewarded by
being re-employed and earning positive rents in future periods; shirking workers are punished
through dismissal. Moreover, many ﬁrms ration jobs and oﬀer fewer vacancies than feasible.
Job rationing together with the presence of high worker rents indicates that unemployment
in the IC treatment is involuntary. In the C treatment where eﬀort is veriﬁable and explicitly
enforced, labor market outcomes diﬀer substantially along all these dimensions. Firms pay
wages close to the market clearing level and reap the major share of production surplus.
Employment relations are shorter than in the IC treatment and the overwhelming majority
of ﬁrms does not ration jobs. As a result, unemployment in this treatment is very low and
mostly voluntary, being caused by workers who do not accept existing contract oﬀers.
The necessity to rely on implicit performance incentives also generates strong market
dynamics in the IC treatment. Since workers condition their work eﬀort on the wage received,
ﬁrms generally earn higher proﬁts when paying generous rents to workers. At the same time,
the decreasing-returns-to-scale production technology generates a potential trade-oﬀ between
rents paid per worker, the number of workers employed, and ﬁrm proﬁts. Indeed, in early
2periods of the experiment we ﬁnd that ﬁrm proﬁts are highest when generous rent payments
are accompanied with a rationing of job oﬀers through ﬁrms. The diﬀerence in proﬁts
between ﬁrms who do and those who do not ration jobs creates strong dynamics towards
adopting a strategy that involves job rationing; this in turn yields a substantial increase in
the level of unemployment. After an initial phase in which we observe this trend, however,
a plateau seems to be reached and a relatively stable fraction of ﬁrms continues to operate
without rationing job oﬀers. In this later phase, unemployment stabilizes on a high level
and ﬁrm proﬁts do no longer depend on ﬁrm size. Rather, two types of ﬁrms seem to coexist
in the long run. We show that employment relationships in the diﬀerent ﬁrm types diﬀer in
several important dimensions other than ﬁrm size. In particular, workers earn substantially
lower rents and we observe higher worker turnover in ﬁrms which do not ration jobs. In the
long run, the situation in the IC treatment thus resembles a segmented labor market in which
some workers are employed in “primary sector” jobs involving relatively stable employment
relationships and generous rent sharing and other workers are working under less favorable
conditions in “secondary sector” jobs (Doeringer and Piore 1971, Saint-Paul 1996).
Eﬃciency wage theories have long postulated that the absence of explicit contract en-
forcement can lead to involuntary unemployment (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984, MacLeod and
Malcomson 1989, Akerlof and Yellen 1990). In this paper we empirically establish a direct
causal link between contract enforcement and the emergence of unemployment. So far, there
has been only indirect evidence which suggested that this link might exist. For instance,
in labor market surveys as well as in economic experiments it has been shown that fairness
concerns in environments characterized by contractual incompleteness can be the cause of
wage rigidities (Campbell III and Kamlani 1997, Bewley 1999, Fehr and Falk 1999). In a
setup similar to ours, Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004) have shown that the absence of third
party contract enforcement leads to a “bilateralization” of trade, where interaction between
ﬁrms and workers is characterized by long-term employment relationships with high wages
and high eﬀort. Unemployment, however, is exogenously given in their experiments and
ﬁrms have no option to ration jobs.
The paper most closely related to ours is the work by Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1996)
who study imperfect monitoring and unemployment in experimental labor markets. How-
3ever, their experimental design diﬀers from ours in a variety of important aspects. First,
they concentrate on one-shot interactions between ﬁrms and workers while our focus is on
relational contracts. Our results show that this feature is important in the absence of explicit
contract enforcement since it allows ﬁrms and workers to make use of the implicit incentives
generated through repeated interaction. Second, as a shortcut for implementing a threat
of dismissal, Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1996) introduce an exogenously given, strictly
positive probability that workers who shirk will be caught and have to pay a penalty to
their ﬁrm. Our setup allows us to directly observe dismissal and re-employment decisions of
ﬁrms. Finally, workers’ productivity in their experiment is private knowledge to ﬁrms and
productivity of some ﬁrms is so low that these ﬁrms cannot proﬁtably oﬀer incentive com-
patible contracts. In contrast, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms ration jobs and involuntary unemployment
emerges although it is always possible for ﬁrms to oﬀer an incentive compatible contract that
yields positive proﬁts.
Our ﬁnding of an endogenous segmentation of the labor market in the IC treatment also
provides interesting new insights for understanding dual labor markets. It has long been ac-
knowledged that dual labor markets can be an implication of contract enforcement problems
and eﬃciency wages. However, in previous models of market segmentation, dual labor mar-
kets typically arise as a consequence of diﬀerences in monitoring technology across sectors
(Bulow and Summers 1986) or due to diﬀerences in adjustment costs to demand ﬂuctua-
tions (Saint-Paul 1996, ch. 4). In our experiment segmentation occurs in the IC treatment
even though all ﬁrms face the same technological constraints. Rather, segmentation is at-
tributable to complex market feedback mechanisms under contractual incompleteness. In
response to the non-veriﬁability of work eﬀort many ﬁrms ration jobs, pay high wages and
employ speciﬁc workers over a long time horizon. As a result, unemployment increases which
in turn allows other ﬁrms to proﬁtably employ a “secondary-sector” contracting strategy, in-
volving lower wage payments and tighter conditions for contract renewal. We show that—in
the presence of high unemployment—workers in these ﬁrms become increasingly willing to
provide eﬀort for a given wage. This holds both with respect to their own behavior earlier on
in the experiment and with respect to workers who are mainly employed in primary sector
ﬁrms. It is this change in behavior of secondary-sector workers that drives the convergence
4in ﬁrm proﬁts and, ultimately, enables the coexistence of two diﬀerent ﬁrm strategies in the
market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the following section outlines our
experimental setup. Section 3 derives behavioral predictions and Section 4 presents the
empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
To study the impact of contractual incompleteness on unemployment, we implemented an
experimental labor market where we exogenously varied the veriﬁability of work eﬀort. In
the market, ﬁrms and workers interacted during 18 market periods. Each of the 18 peri-
ods consisted of two stages: a market phase where ﬁrms oﬀered employment contracts and
hired workers, and a work phase where work eﬀort of employed workers was determined.
The experimental treatments diﬀered only in the degree to which work eﬀort in the second
phase was third party enforceable. In our main treatment, henceforth called Incomplete Con-
tracts Treatment (or IC treatment), third party contract enforcement was absent and workers
thus could depart from the contractually agreed upon eﬀort level. By contrast, the eﬀort
level stipulated in the employment contract was explicitly enforced in our control treatment,
henceforth called Complete Contracts Treatment (or C treatment). Keeping everything else
identical (production technology, supply and demand of labor, etc) while varying the level of
third party enforcement allows us to causally identify the eﬀects of contractual incomplete-
ness. This provides complementary evidence to non-experimental studies of labor market
outcomes (e.g., Krueger and Summers 1988, Blanchﬂower, Oswald, and Sanfrey 1996; see
Falk and Heckman 2009 for a methodological discussion).
2.1 The Market Phase
Firms were the contract makers in the market phase. When oﬀering a contract, ﬁrms stip-
ulated a non-contingent wage payment w and a desired level of eﬀort ˆ e. To study the
relevance of long-term employment relationships in the diﬀerent treatment conditions, ﬁrms
could make two types of contract oﬀers: public oﬀers which were available to all workers and
could also be observed by all other ﬁrms, or private contract oﬀers that were only available to
5one speciﬁc worker. The latter type of contract oﬀer allowed ﬁrms to rehire certain workers
and interact repeatedly with them. To enable the formation of long-term relations, in the
beginning of the experiment each worker and each ﬁrm received an identiﬁcation number
(ID) which was held constant throughout the whole experimental session. If an employer
wanted to (re)hire a speciﬁc worker via a private contract oﬀer, she had to specify the ID of
the worker in addition to the wage and desired eﬀort level when entering the contract oﬀer.
In this case, only the selected worker was informed about the contract oﬀer, and only this
worker could accept the oﬀer.
In a certain market period, each employer could hire up to two workers. As long as
none of her contract oﬀers had been accepted in a given period, an employer could make
as many private and public oﬀers as she wanted. A worker could accept all contract oﬀers
available to him, i.e., all public oﬀers that were not yet accepted and private oﬀers that ﬁrms
had addressed to him. Once a worker accepted a contract oﬀer, the contract between this
worker and the respective ﬁrm was concluded. After concluding a contract, a worker was not
allowed to accept further contract oﬀers in this period. Additionally, all other outstanding
oﬀers of the respective employer were removed from the list of available contracts in the
moment where one of her contract oﬀers was accepted. The employer could then decide to
hire a second worker by entering new contract oﬀers. This market feature was implemented
to prevent that an employer who wanted to employ only one worker but entered multiple
contract oﬀers had two oﬀers accepted before being able to withdraw her remaining contract
oﬀers.
The market phase ended when the maximum number of contracts had been concluded
or when all ﬁrms had indicated that they did not want to make additional contract oﬀers.1
At the end of the market period, the worker(s) of a given ﬁrm were informed about the
contracts concluded by their ﬁrm, i.e., each worker received a summary of his own contract
terms as well as information on whether and under which conditions his ﬁrm had employed
1We also implemented a maximum trading time of 200 seconds for each market phase. This constraint
was, however, only binding in few occasions (mostly in the C treatment). The impact of the time constraint
on the level of unemployment and other market outcomes reported below is therefore limited and conﬁned
to the control treatment with explicit contract enforcement (see Section 4.1).
6a second worker. Providing this information can be important for workers when contracts
are not third party enforceable (IC treatment). If some workers base their work eﬀort on the
extent to which their ﬁrm shares production rents, e.g., because they respond to fair wage
payments, knowledge of oﬀered rents, productivity, and ﬁrm size is important for workers
(see Section 2.3 and Section 3).
2.2 The Work Phase
After the end of the market phase, employed workers entered the second stage of a market
period—the work phase. In this stage, actual work eﬀort e was determined. Since eﬀort was
contractible in the complete contracts treatment, workers who had accepted a contract oﬀer
in this treatment had to comply with the contract terms. The desired eﬀort level ˆ e stipulated
in their contract was thus explicitly enforced; i.e., e = ˆ e was exogenously implemented by
the experimenter. By contrast, work eﬀort was observable, but not veriﬁable in our main
treatment (IC treatment). Therefore, a worker could choose any feasible level of eﬀort in the
work phase, i.e., he could also exert less or more eﬀort than stipulated in his employment
contract. Workers’ eﬀort choices, together with ﬁrms’ wage payments, determined material
payoﬀs of ﬁrms and workers. Before the next period started, a ﬁrm and its worker(s) were
informed about actual work eﬀorts and the resulting payoﬀs for the ﬁrm and the workers
employed by this ﬁrm.
2.3 Parameters and Procedures
Participants’ roles were randomly assigned at the beginning of the experiment and kept con-
stant throughout all market periods. In every market, we had 17 workers and 7 ﬁrms. Since
ﬁrms could employ at most two workers, this implies that three workers were “exogenously”





w − c(e) if worker accepted a contract [w, ˆ e]
0 if unemployed
A worker who remained unemployed in a given period received a payoﬀ of 0 points. An
employed worker received the wage w speciﬁed in his contract and had to bear the cost
of the work eﬀort he provided, c(e). The set of feasible eﬀorts and wages was given by
7e ∈ {1,2,...,10} and w ∈ {0,1,2,...,100}. Eﬀort costs c(e) increased convexly in the level of
actual work eﬀort (see Table 1).
Eﬀort level e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cost of eﬀort c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
Table 1: Schedule of eﬀort costs.
A ﬁrm’s material payoﬀ depended on the number of workers hired, the wage(s) paid,
and the eﬀort exerted by the worker(s). Firms’ production technology was characterized by
decreasing returns to scale. Speciﬁcally, each unit of eﬀort by a worker increased production
(and the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ) by 10 points if only one worker was employed by the ﬁrm. If two
workers were employed, each unit of eﬀort increased the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ by 7 points. The
contractually stipulated wage payments diminished ﬁrms’ proﬁts. The material payoﬀ of a
ﬁrm, πF, can therefore be summarized as follows:
πF =

   
   
10e1 − w1 if one worker employed
7(e1 + e2) − w1 − w2 if two workers employed
0 else
e1 (e2) denotes the eﬀort provided by the ﬁrst (second) worker, and w1 (w2) is the wage
paid to the ﬁrst (second) worker employed by the ﬁrm. Note that this speciﬁcation of the
production technology implies that eﬃciency is maximized when two workers are employed
and maximum eﬀort is exerted: the second worker’s marginal productivity per unit of eﬀort
is 4 whereas the marginal cost of eﬀort lies between 1 and 3 points. Payoﬀ functions πF and
πW, workers’ cost schedule c(e) as well as the number of ﬁrms and workers in the market
were common knowledge.
The experiment was carried out in the BonnEconLab, the laboratory for economic exper-
iments at the University of Bonn. We conducted ﬁve sessions each for the IC treatment and
the C treatment. A total of 240 subjects, mainly undergraduate university students from all
majors, took part in the experiments. Every subject participated only in one of the treat-
ment conditions. At the beginning of an experimental session, participants received detailed
8information about the rules and structure of the experiment.2 The experiment started only
after all participants had answered several control questions correctly. In addition, subjects
played one trial period of the market phase to ensure that they understood how to use the
computer program. Sessions lasted about 110 minutes and subjects earned on average 25.49
Euro (about 35 USD at the time of the experiment), including a showup fee of 8 Euro. The
experiments were computerized using the software “z-Tree” (Fischbacher 2007); subjects
were recruited with the online recruitment system by Greiner (2003).
3 Behavioral Predictions
As indicated in Section 2, eﬃciency is maximized when all ﬁrms employ two workers and
all workers exert maximum eﬀort. If it is common knowledge that players are rational and
selﬁsh, and if eﬀort is contractible (C treatment), we should expect that proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrms implement the ﬁrst best outcome and reap all gains from trade: in each period, ﬁrms
will employ two workers, oﬀering contracts which ask for maximum eﬀort (ˆ e = e = 10)
and pay the minimum acceptable wage. As unemployed workers receive zero unemployment
beneﬁts, this wage is equal to the cost of the implemented eﬀort, i.e., w = c(10) = 18
points. Since there are 7 ﬁrms and 17 workers in each market, three workers will remain
unemployed by design of the experiment. As we are interested in unemployment which
arises endogenously through market interaction between ﬁrms and workers, we will refer to
the situation where the maximum number of workers is employed and only three workers
remain “exogenously” unemployed as full employment in what follows.
Maintaining the benchmark assumption of materially selﬁsh agents, the absence of third
party contract enforcement is predicted to lead to diﬀerent outcomes in terms of wage oﬀers
and eﬀort choices, but not unemployment. Since our setup constitutes a game of ﬁnite
length and since eﬀort is costly, but not veriﬁable, workers will choose the minimum eﬀort
e = 1 in the ﬁnal period of the IC treatment, irrespective of the wage and desired eﬀort
level stipulated in their contract. Anticipating this, money-maximizing ﬁrms will pay the
2A translation of the instructions is available upon request. To rule out that diﬀerences in participants’
experiences from their employment relations outside the laboratory could bias our results, instructions were
framed in a neutral goods-market language.
9minimum acceptable wage for an eﬀort of 1 in this period. This amounts to a wage payment
w = c(1) = 0 since workers’ outside option is to remain unemployed and receive zero rents.3
Through backward induction, the outcome of minimal eﬀort (and minimal wage) should also
hold in all pre-ﬁnal periods of the IC treatment. This contrasts with non-minimal wages and
high eﬀort levels when contracts are complete. Importantly, however, the two treatments
should not diﬀer in the second dimension of market eﬃciency—the level of unemployment.
In particular, under the assumption of money-maximizing behavior of all players we should
still expect full employment even though contracts are not third party enforceable. To see
this, note that—given our assumptions on production technology and payoﬀ functions—it is
more proﬁtable for a ﬁrm to employ two workers at the minimum possible wage (w = 0) who
exert minimum eﬀort (e = 1) compared to employing just one worker at such a wage-eﬀort
combination.
If the assumption of all selﬁsh types does not hold, and some agents are fair-minded in
the sense of losing utility when rents are shared unequally, the predictions for the complete
contract setting are largely unchanged. Fairness might lead some workers to reject oﬀers
that involve very unequal payoﬀs in the C treatment, but theory and previous evidence sug-
gest that this is unlikely to happen (see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999). In particular, the
competition for jobs in our setting means that workers cannot eﬀectively punish a ﬁrm by
rejecting an oﬀer; a ﬁrm can likely just ﬁnd another worker. Without the potential for equal-
izing payoﬀs, rejection does not improve utility of fair workers, and in such circumstances
even fair-minded workers tend to accept contracts with unequal rents. Thus, ﬁrms are still
predicted to achieve close to the ﬁrst best, and workers are predicted to earn zero rents.
With incomplete contracts, by contrast, the presence of fair types substantially changes
predictions. Rather than expressing fairness concerns by rejecting oﬀers, fair workers can
accept a contract and then equalize payoﬀs through the eﬀort choice. As a consequence, it
could be that eﬀort levels are an increasing function of the wage oﬀer, because fair workers
reciprocate a “fair” wage by choosing a high eﬀort level. Indeed, there is mounting evidence
both from laboratory (e.g., Fehr and G¨ achter 2000, Brown, Falk, and Fehr 2004) and ﬁeld
3Assuming that workers reject contract oﬀers with net payoﬀs equal to their outside option yields [w, ˆ e] =
[1,1] in IC and [w, ˆ e] = [19,10] in C.
10studies (e.g., Bewley 1999, Kube, Mar´ echal, and Puppe 2008, Cohn, Fehr, and G¨ otte 2008)
which suggests that the slope of e(w) is positive due to some workers having fairness concerns
(see also Akerlof 1982 and Akerlof and Yellen 1990). Whether it is actually proﬁtable for ﬁrms
to oﬀer positive rents, however, depends crucially on the magnitude of the eﬀort response.
In a repeated interaction setting like ours, it is plausible that strategic behavior of money-
maximizing workers actually strengthens the responsiveness of eﬀort to the wage, simply
because selﬁsh workers have an incentive to imitate fair workers if this causes ﬁrms to re-
hire them and pay rents in the future (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984, MacLeod and Malcomson
1998). In our setting, ﬁrms can engage in such long-term relational contracts by using
private contract oﬀers and combining rent payments with an implicit threat of ﬁring in case
a worker does not provide suﬃciently high eﬀort. Future rents provide an incentive for
money-maximizing workers to perform, and current rent payments may also be important,
as a signal that the employer will not try to renege on wage payments in the future (MacLeod
and Malcomson 1998). Notably, the presence of some fair workers makes it credible that
ﬁrms will pay non-minimal wages (rents) even in the ﬁnal market period. This potentially
allows ﬁrms to provide an incentive for selﬁsh workers to perform in the pre-ﬁnal and earlier
periods, despite the ﬁnite horizon of the game.4 Thus, due to both fairness and strategic
motives of workers, it may be proﬁtable for ﬁrms to oﬀer positive rents and to engage in
long-term relationships when contracts are incomplete.
The necessity to pay strictly positive rents to elicit work eﬀort under contractual incom-
pleteness, however, might lead to unemployment in the IC treatment. Because of decreasing
returns to scale, ﬁrms which employ two workers might not be able to oﬀer suﬃciently gen-
erous rents compared to ﬁrms which employ only one worker. It could thus be proﬁtable for
ﬁrms in the IC treatment to ration job oﬀers and employ only one worker at a generous wage.
This, however, gives rise to involuntary unemployment. Workers would be willing to accept
4The presence of a ﬁnal period rent avoids the problem of unraveling due to backward induction. More
formally, Brown, Falk, and Fehr (2004) have shown for a labor market similar to our IC treatment that the
presence of a minority of fair-minded players is suﬃcient to sustain a pooling equilibrium where ﬁrms build
up long-term employment relationships involving strictly positive rent payments and a policy of contingent
contract renewal and where all workers provide high levels of eﬀort in pre-ﬁnal periods of the game. In the
ﬁnal period, fair workers provide payoﬀ equalizing eﬀort, while selﬁsh workers shirk.
11contract oﬀers for (less than) the prevailing wage, but ﬁrms do not oﬀer enough contracts.
Obviously, the relative proﬁtability of employing one or two workers strongly depends on
the wage payments that are necessary to induce work eﬀort; i.e., on the slope of e(w). For
instance, in the presence of fair-minded workers it is crucial what these workers consider to
be a fair wage.
It is possible that what constitutes a suﬃciently generous wage from a worker’s perspec-
tive is itself inﬂuenced by market conditions. This could come about through a changed
perception of what is a fair wage, as argued by Akerlof and Yellen (1990). Along these lines,
Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogen (2007) have recently provided survey evidence support-
ing the view that local labor market conditions might aﬀect workers’ fairness perceptions.
Changing market conditions can also reduce shirking for incentive reasons. For example, be-
ing ﬁred for shirking becomes more costly for a worker in expected terms as unemployment
rises, due to the fall in the chance of ﬁnding another job. If such mechanisms are relevant,
changes in market conditions will feed back into workers’ behavior. As we will see below,
the endogenous increase in unemployment and an associated decline in the job acquisition
rate indeed contributes to the segmentation of the labor market in the IC treatment, via a
change in workers’ behavior.
In the following section, we test the behavioral predictions with our experimental data.
We ﬁrst analyze the causal impact of third party contract enforcement on the level of unem-
ployment. We then study treatment diﬀerences in other market characteristics to analyze
whether the channels through which contract enforcement aﬀects unemployment are in line
with our hypotheses. Finally, we take a closer look at the IC treatment and study how
market outcomes and behavior of ﬁrms and workers interact.
4 Results
4.1 Unemployment—Aggregate Market Outcomes
We ﬁrst turn to our main question: does the extent to which explicit contract enforcement is
possible causally impact the level of unemployment? Figure 1 depicts the level of “endoge-
12nous unemployment”5 for the two treatment conditions. Initially, unemployment rates do
not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the diﬀerent market environments (Mann-Whitney U-Test
for period 1 observations only, p = 0.217)6. After the ﬁrst few periods, however, we observe
a strong increase in unemployment in the IC treatment, while the level of unemployment
stays close to zero when contracts are third party enforceable. As a consequence, the overall
level of unemployment diﬀers substantially across treatment conditions. When eﬀort is not
veriﬁable, the average unemployment rate is higher than 30% while it is only about 5% in
the C treatment. In all sessions of the IC treatment unemployment is higher than in any of
the C sessions. The diﬀerence between treatments is statistically signiﬁcant (Mann-Whitney
U-Test, p < 0.01).
Result 1: We observe strong diﬀerences in unemployment between treatment con-
ditions. Under explicit contract enforcement (C treatment), unemployment levels
are close to the minimal possible level. When eﬀort is not veriﬁable (IC treatment),
unemployment rises strongly before stabilizing at a relatively high level.
The absence of third party contract enforcement has a strong and positive impact on the
level of unemployment. We have hypothesized in Section 3 that this might be the result of
diﬀerences in how labor markets function under explicit and implicit contract enforcement.
In particular, we have argued that ﬁrms in the C treatment should operate most proﬁtably
if they hire the maximum possible number of workers and minimize wage costs for a given—
explicitly enforced—eﬀort level. We therefore should expect low rent payments to workers
and high eﬀort levels in this treatment. Furthermore, since eﬀort is contractually enforce-
able, ﬁrms have no reason to engage in relational contracting, i.e., to (re-) employ speciﬁc
performing workers via private contract oﬀers. We should thus see more public contract
oﬀers and shorter employment spells in comparison to the IC treatment.
5Remember that, in both treatments, 3 workers were unemployed “by design” in every session and every
period due to excess supply of labor. To measure “endogenous unemployment” we therefore calculate the
total number of unemployed workers minus 3 and divide by the number of possible jobs (given that each of
7 ﬁrms could oﬀer 2 vacancies in every period the number of possible jobs in each market is 14).
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Figure 1: Evolution of average unemployment over time.
In contrast to this, ﬁrms in the IC treatment have to rely on a combination of generous
wages and implicit incentives to elicit work eﬀort. We hypothesized that ﬁrms will use pri-
vate contract oﬀers to implement a policy of contingent contract renewal that combines an
(implicit) promise of future rent payments with a threat of contract termination when the
worker’s performance is not suﬃcient. To qualify for future employment, workers are ex-
pected to respond to these implicit incentives by reciprocating more generous wage payments
with higher performance. We should thus observe a stronger positive correlation between
wages and eﬀorts when contracts are not explicitly enforced.
Table 2 shows that our hypotheses on diﬀerences in market characteristics are borne
out by the data. When contracts are third-party enforceable, markets are characterized by
low (oﬀered and realized) worker rents, eﬀorts are close to the maximum level, and ﬁrms
predominantly hire workers via public contract oﬀers. By contrast, the IC treatment is
characterized by more generous wage and rent payments, and eﬀorts and wages are much
more strongly correlated.7 As hypothesized, long-term employment relationships initiated
7Notably, the average wage-eﬀort correlation is about twenty percentage points lower in the ﬁnal period
of IC compared to the overall average correlation, indicating that removal of ﬁring threat aﬀects average
behavior. But the correlation is still sizable, and highly signiﬁcant (0.58; p < 0.001), consistent with the
presence of some fair types who put in non-minimal eﬀort even in the ﬁnal period.
14through private contract oﬀers play a bigger role when contracts are implicit. Firms are
more selective in hiring speciﬁc workers. Consequently, the fraction of private contract oﬀers
is substantially higher in the IC treatment. Analyzing the hiring strategy at the ﬁrm level
underlines these diﬀerences: 51% of ﬁrms in the IC treatment rehire the same worker in at
least half of the market periods without interruption. The corresponding fraction of ﬁrms
who does so in the C treatment is merely 3%. Overall, ﬁrms in the IC treatment are quite
successful in eliciting eﬀort through implicit performance incentives: while average eﬀort is
lower than under explicit contract enforcement, workers in the IC treatment choose an eﬀort
level of 8–10 in more than 50% of cases, and minimum eﬀort is observed in only 12% of
cases.
C treatment IC treatment U-Test
1) Wages 22.80 36.60 p < 0.01
2) Rents oﬀered by ﬁrms (w − c(ˆ e)) 5.74 21.12 p < 0.01
3) Realized worker rents (w − c(e)) 5.74 23.59 p < 0.01
4) Eﬀort 9.65 6.97 p < 0.01
5) Wage-eﬀort correlation 0.12 0.79 p < 0.01
6) Fraction of private contract oﬀers 0.305 0.765 p < 0.01
7) Fraction of ﬁrms with employment 0.029 0.514 p < 0.01
relationships ≥ 9 market periods
8) Fraction of possible vacancies oﬀered 0.986 0.679 p < 0.01
9) Fraction of oﬀered vacancies accepted 0.961 0.992 p < 0.05
Table 2: Market characteristics. Means values across treatments; p-values (two-sided) are
based on session averages.
The diﬀerence in the number of contract oﬀers between treatments deserves particular
attention. We have hypothesized that the emergence of unemployment in the IC treatment
might be a consequence of the necessity to pay higher rents for eliciting work eﬀort. Since
ﬁrms face decreasing returns to scale, they might not be able to pay suﬃciently generous rents
when employing two workers. Therefore, ﬁrms might prefer to ration job oﬀers and employ
15fewer workers than the maximum possible. The results on oﬀered and accepted contracts
(see the ﬁnal two lines of Table 2) are in line with this prediction. In both treatments, the
number of potential vacancies that ﬁrms could oﬀer is 1260. While nearly 99% of these
potential vacancies are actually oﬀered in the C treatment (1242 out of 1260), ﬁrms in the
IC treatment make only 68% (856 / 1260) of the possible contract oﬀers. At the same time,
workers in both treatments hardly ever reject an oﬀered vacancy. The corresponding fraction
of accepted vacancies is even slightly higher in the IC treatment.
Figure 2 sheds more light on ﬁrms’ decision to ration jobs in the IC treatment. The
dashed lines depict the fractions of ﬁrms who oﬀer a second vacancy in a given period. The
solid lines indicate the fractions of second vacancies ﬁlled, i.e., oﬀers which are accepted by
some worker. Paralleling the observation on the unemployment level, the fraction of ﬁrms
who seek to hire two workers is initially similar in both treatments. After a few periods this
fraction increases to more than 90% in the C treatment, but fewer and fewer ﬁrms decide to
employ two workers in the IC treatment, in particular through periods 1-7. The solid lines
conﬁrm that unﬁlled vacancies, which would be an indication for voluntary unemployment,
are rarely observed in either treatment. If anything, the fraction of rejected contract oﬀers
is somewhat higher in the C treatment.8 Again, this aggregate result is conﬁrmed when we
analyze the hiring strategy at the ﬁrm level. In the C treatment, a vast majority of ﬁrms
employ two workers in nearly all periods: all ﬁrms employ two workers in at least 12 market
periods, and 83% of ﬁrms hire two workers in 15 or more periods. The corresponding fraction
of ﬁrms who do so in the IC treatment is only 17.1% and 11.4%, respectively.
The prevalence of job rationing, the high rents paid to workers and the low frequency of
rejected job oﬀers under contractual incompleteness indicate that unemployment in the IC
treatment is involuntary.
Result 2: When contracts are not explicitly enforceable, ﬁrms tend to ration job
oﬀers, build up long-term employment relationships, and pay generous rents to their
worker. The resulting unemployment is involuntary.
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Figure 2: Fraction of ﬁrms oﬀering / ﬁlling two vacancies.
4.2 Labor Market Segmentation as a Consequence of Contract
Enforcement Problems
In the previous section we have seen that—when contracts are explicitly enforced—essentially
all ﬁrms hire two workers and there is nearly full employment. Firms in the C treatment
also pay wages close to the market clearing level and extract the major share of rents from
production. Under contractual incompleteness, we have argued that it is attractive for ﬁrms
to rely on long-term employment relationships, pay generous rents to workers and ration
job oﬀers. In the long run, we would thus expect all ﬁrms in the IC treatment to adopt a
one-worker strategy.
A closer inspection of Figure 2, however, reveals that the latter prediction is only partly
true. The ﬁgure conﬁrms that in the C treatment nearly all ﬁrms employ two workers.
Moreover, in the IC treatments there are strong dynamics towards a one-worker strategy in
the ﬁrst seven periods. In this phase, the decline in the fraction of ﬁrms who use a two-worker
strategy is sizable and statistically signiﬁcant (t-test, p < 0.01).9 However, the number of
9The reported test statistics come from regressing the fraction of two-worker ﬁrms in a given period and
a given session of the IC treatment on a linear time trend for the early phase (periods 1–7) and late phase
(periods 8–18), allowing for diﬀerent slopes and intercepts for the diﬀerent phases. The reported p-values
17two-worker ﬁrms, i.e., ﬁrms who employ two workers in a given period, does not go all the
way down to zero in later periods. Rather, after the initial strong decline in the number of
two-worker ﬁrms a plateau seems to be reached where a relatively stable fraction of about 20–
30% of ﬁrms continue to employ two workers. In this later phase (periods 8–18), the decline
in the fraction of two-worker ﬁrms is essentially zero and not signiﬁcant anymore (t-test,
p = 0.219). The diﬀerence in dynamics between the two phases is statistically signiﬁcant
(t-test, p < 0.05). In other words, after a ﬁrst phase where we observe strong dynamics
towards adopting a one-worker strategy, two types of ﬁrms seem to coexist in later periods
of the IC treatment. In contrast, all ﬁrms seem to employ the same hiring strategy in the C
treatment.
A potential explanation for the observed dynamics in the IC treatment would be that
two-worker ﬁrms were relatively less proﬁtable than one-worker ﬁrms only in the early phase
of the experiment, but that in the long run both strategies yielded similar proﬁts for ﬁrms. A
convergence of proﬁts between the diﬀerent ﬁrm types might explain why some ﬁrms choose
to adopt a two-worker strategy even in the long run. In fact, there is a strong diﬀerence
in ﬁrm proﬁts during the ﬁrst seven periods: in this phase, one-worker ﬁrms on average
earn 37.21 points per period—12.55 points more than ﬁrms who employ two workers. The
diﬀerence in ﬁrm proﬁts is statistically signiﬁcant (t-test, p = 0.010). In contrast, during the
late phase of the experiment proﬁts between one-worker ﬁrms and two-worker ﬁrms do not
diﬀer signiﬁcantly anymore (the average diﬀerence is 1.42 points; t-test, p = 0.847). This
convergence in ﬁrm proﬁts is due to an increase of two-worker ﬁrms’ proﬁtability. While
proﬁts of one-worker ﬁrms remain virtually unchanged (proﬁts fall insigniﬁcantly by 0.48
points; t-test, p = 0.843), two-worker ﬁrms earn on average 10.65 points more than in the
early phase of the experiment (t-test, p = 0.036).
Figure 3 (top panel) conﬁrms the proﬁt diﬀerences between one-worker ﬁrms and two-
worker ﬁrms in early periods. The ﬁgure is based on parameter estimates for ﬁrm proﬁts
in the ﬁrst seven periods of the IC treatment, depending on whether ﬁrms employ one or
two workers in a given period. As regressors, we include the wage paid per worker and the
squared value of the wage to account for possible non-linearities in the proﬁt-wage relation.
are adjusted for clustering on the session level.
18The ﬁgure conﬁrms that ﬁrm proﬁts tend to increase in wage payments up to a maximum
after which it does not pay oﬀ for ﬁrms to further increase worker rents. Importantly, the
ﬁgure shows that two-worker ﬁrms tend to earn substantially lower proﬁts irrespective of
the wage they paid to their workers. Consequently, the proﬁt-maximizing strategy for ﬁrms
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Figure 3: Predicted total proﬁts of one-worker ﬁrms and two-worker ﬁrms in the IC treat-
ment, depending on the wage paid per worker. Upper panel: periods 1–7, bottom panel:
periods 8–18.
Turning to the later phase of the experiment (bottom panel of Figure 3), one-worker
ﬁrms continue to be similarly proﬁtable compared to early periods. However, proﬁts for
two-worker ﬁrms change dramatically. According to our estimates, two-worker ﬁrms earn
19similar proﬁts as one-worker ﬁrms in this phase when choosing the proﬁt-maximizing wage.
The fact that—in the long run—proﬁts of one-worker ﬁrms and two-worker ﬁrms are similar
suggests that the contract enforcement problems in the IC treatment cause a labor market
segmentation. In the absence of explicit contract enforcement, two diﬀerent ﬁrm strategies
coexist in the same market: a majority of ﬁrms employ a one-worker strategy. At the same
time, a second segment exists, consisting of ﬁrms who proﬁtably use a diﬀerent contracting
strategy.
Indeed, considering the later market phase of the IC treatment, the two segments qual-
itatively diﬀer in several important dimensions other than ﬁrm size. While both strategies
yield similar proﬁts for ﬁrms, workers in two-worker ﬁrms face much less favorable contract
terms than their counterparts in one-worker ﬁrms. Wages in one-worker ﬁrms are on average
42.33 points—14.63 points higher than those for workers employed in two-worker ﬁrms. This
diﬀerence indicates that one-worker ﬁrms pay higher rents than two-worker ﬁrms. Indeed,
rents oﬀered to workers in one-worker ﬁrms are almost 70% higher than those oﬀered by ﬁrms
who employ two workers. While workers in one-worker ﬁrms also work somewhat harder (the
diﬀerence in eﬀort levels is 1.43), the substantially higher wages in one-worker ﬁrms result
in much higher realized rents for workers in those ﬁrms. On average, rents for workers em-
ployed in one-worker ﬁrms are 29.21 points whereas rents for workers in two-worker ﬁrms
amount to 17.55 points per period. The two segments also seem to diﬀer in the hiring and
worker retainment strategies used by ﬁrms: 90.04% of ﬁrm-worker matches in one-worker
ﬁrms are initiated through private contract oﬀers. This number is 12.5 percentage points
higher than in two-worker ﬁrms. In addition, turnover rates diﬀer substantially between
the two diﬀerent ﬁrm types: a worker’s likelihood of being dismissed after a given period is
23.78% in one-worker ﬁrms and 46.20% in two-worker ﬁrms.
Result 3: Contract enforcement problems lead to a labor market segmentation.
In the long run, two diﬀerent types of ﬁrms coexist in the market with incomplete
contracts. These earn similar proﬁts, but diﬀer qualitatively with respect to turnover
and worker rents.
204.3 Explaining Labor Market Segmentation
Our evidence so far indicates that contract enforcement problems cause both involuntary
unemployment and a segmentation of the labor market. This raises the question what drives
the segmentation of the labor market in the IC treatment. In particular, it is interesting to
analyze why the proﬁtability of two-worker ﬁrms increases in the long run and eventually
converges to the level of one-worker ﬁrms (see Figure 3). Since ﬁrm proﬁts in our setup
are solely determined by wage payments and workers’ eﬀort provision, it has to be the case
that in the late phase workers in two-worker ﬁrms exert higher levels of eﬀort for a given
wage compared to the early phase of the experiment. In fact, an estimation of wage-eﬀort
relations in two-worker ﬁrms during the early and late phase indicates that workers tend to
provide signiﬁcantly higher eﬀort for a given wage during the late phase.10 The question is
why this change occurrs.
There are two plausible reasons for why we observe this pattern. First, it could be the
case that workers in our experiment diﬀer in their inherent willingness to provide eﬀort for
a certain wage. To operate successfully, ﬁrms who employ a two-worker strategy have to
ﬁnd workers who are willing to provide high eﬀort for a lower wage than ﬁrms who employ
only one worker. This selection process of “less demanding” workers into two-worker ﬁrms
might take some time, and therefore the proﬁtability of two-worker ﬁrms increases only once
appropriate workers have been found. The second potential explanation for the increase in
two-worker ﬁrms’ proﬁtability is that workers adapt their behavior over the course of the
experiment. In other words, workers in two-worker ﬁrms might change their willingness to
provide eﬀort for a given wage in response to the observed market dynamics. The high level
of unemployment and the prevalence of job rationing by one-worker ﬁrms in later periods
of the IC treatment increases the cost of being unemployed. This is underlined by the fact
that the job acquisition rate, i.e., the fraction of previously unemployed workers who ﬁnd
employment in a given period, drops from more than 70% in the ﬁrst periods to about 25%
10This result is based on an OLS regression of eﬀort on wage, a dummy variable for the late phase of
the experiment, and an interaction term between the dummy and the wage. The sample is restricted to
two-worker ﬁrms. The interaction term is signiﬁcant (p = 0.015) and indicates a 27 percent increase in the
marginal eﬀect of wage on eﬀort, relative to the early phase.
21in the later phase of the IC treatment. In the long run, workers in two-worker ﬁrms might
therefore become more willing to exert higher eﬀort for a given wage in order to avoid job
losses.
To disentangle the two explanations, we ﬁrst analyze individual behavior of workers
who are predominantly employed in two-worker ﬁrms during the late phase. That is, we
concentrate on workers who work in a two-worker ﬁrm in at least 50% of their employment
spells between period 8 and 18. If selection of workers who are willing to perform for low
wages is the explanation for the increase in proﬁts of two-worker ﬁrms, these workers should
already exhibit high eﬀorts for a given wage level in the early phase of the experiment. If, in
contrast, labor market segmentation and the increased proﬁtability of two-worker ﬁrms are
due to market feedback mechanisms, we should observe a change in the behavior of those
workers. More precisely, we should observe an increase in eﬀort for a given wage between
the early phase and the late phase of the experiment.
Figure 4 compares behavior of workers who are mostly employed in two-worker ﬁrms
during the late phase to the behavior of the same workers earlier in the experiment. The
ﬁgure shows a clear increase in eﬀort provision between the early and the late phase for the
workers. The increase in eﬀort holds for the entire range of wage levels, and in particular for
wages below 40. This is important since contracts involving such relatively low wages account
for about 70% of contracts in two-worker ﬁrms and are, at the same time, the contracts that
are particularly proﬁtable for two-worker ﬁrms (see Figure 3).11 This result strongly suggests
that the increase in two-worker ﬁrms’ proﬁtability is attributable to a response of workers to
the tighter labor market conditions rather than to selecting workers who have an inherently
higher willingness to provide eﬀort.12
We also ﬁnd evidence for a link between market conditions, and the probability of shirk-
11An OLS regression shows that the increase is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level for several
of the wage categories individually (for 30 to 39, p = 0.035; 40 to 49, p = 0.018), and jointly for wage
intervals spanning the range 0 to 49 (F-test, p < 0.001).
12The limited role of worker selection is further underlined by the fact that, if anything, workers who are
later on predominantly employed in two-worker ﬁrms tend to exert lower eﬀorts for a given wage in the early
phase of the experiment compared those workers who later are mostly employed in one-worker ﬁrms. See
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Figure 4: Average eﬀort for a given wage. Values for workers who predominantly work in
two-worker ﬁrms during the late phase of the experiment. To account for the strong decline
in eﬀorts and wages during the ﬁnal periods (“endgame-eﬀect”), the graph is based on values
for periods 1–16 only.
ing, based on regression analysis. We estimate a Probit regression where the dependent
variable equals 1 if the worker exerts less eﬀort than contractually desired by the ﬁrm. Ex-
planatory variables include the wage, the job acquisition probability in a given period (the
share of unemployed workers who ﬁnd a job in that period), and a dummy variable for
whether the worker has personally experienced unemployment in the previous period. The
estimates show that the falling job acquisition rate is associated with a fall in the probability
of shirking (p = 0.08), and that the eﬀect is sizable: According to the model the 50 per-
centage point drop in the job acquisition rate observed going from the early to late phase of
the experiment implies a 26 percent drop in the probability of shirking. Interestingly, how-
ever, there is an additional eﬀect of a worker having personally experienced unemployment:
Controlling for the acquisition rate, and wages, having personally experienced unemploy-
ment leads to a statistically signiﬁcant (p = 0.013) decrease in the probability of shirking,
of about 20 percent. This suggests that, in our setup, personal experience of unemployment
tends to discipline workers in addition to overall market tightness. It also implies that the
23policy of frequently ﬁring and hiring diﬀerent workers, practiced by two-worker ﬁrms, serves
to ensure that the ﬁrm has workers who are strongly motivated to work.
The feedback from market conditions to worker eﬀort exertion thus helps to explain why
we observe a segmentation in the market in the long run, with one-worker ﬁrms and two-
worker ﬁrms coexisting. One-worker ﬁrms become more and more prevalent over time ini-
tially, increasing unemployment pressure, until the unemployment pressure is strong enough
to make ﬁrms indiﬀerent between adopting a one-worker or two-worker strategy. At this
point there is no incentive for switching from one ﬁrm size to another, and segmentation
emerges in terms of two diﬀerent ﬁrm sizes.
Result 4: Labor market segmentation and the increase in two-worker ﬁrms’ prof-
itability are attributable to an endogenous change in workers’ behavior, which is
associated with changing market conditions.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the relationship between contract enforcement and the emer-
gence of involuntary unemployment. In an experimental labor market where trading parties
can form long-term relationships, we compared a work environment where contracts were
not third party enforceable to a situation where eﬀort was veriﬁable and explicit contracts
were feasible.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows: unemployment is much higher in the treatment without
explicit contract enforcement. Importantly, unemployment in this treatment is involuntary,
being caused by the ﬁrms’ employment and contracting policy. Firms pay high wages but
oﬀer fewer vacancies than is possible and technologically eﬃcient. This policy, however,
succeeds in eliciting high eﬀorts from the employed workers. When complete contracts
can be written, wages are close to the market clearing level, ﬁrms do not ration jobs, and
unemployment is basically absent. Thus, our results empirically establish a direct causal
link between contract enforcement, the nature of employment relations, and the emergence
of unemployment—a link which has since long been discussed in theory (Shapiro and Stiglitz
1984, MacLeod and Malcomson 1989, Akerlof and Yellen 1990, Sobel 2006).
24Our ﬁndings also contribute to the literature on the eﬃciency-wage foundation of dual
labor markets (Bulow and Summers 1986, Saint-Paul 1996). Although ﬁrms face identical
technological constraints in our setup we observe a segmentation of the labor market, result-
ing from contractual incompleteness: when third party contract enforcement is not feasible,
most ﬁrms ration the number of jobs and build up long-term employment relationships which
are characterized by rent-sharing between ﬁrms and workers. The resulting increase in un-
employment allows a minority of ﬁrms to operate successfully without rationing job oﬀers.
Tighter market conditions help these ﬁrms since stronger competition among workers makes
hiring and dismissing workers easier and since workers shirk less. Interactions between these
ﬁrms and their workers resemble those in secondary segments of the labor market (Doeringer
and Piore 1971, Saint-Paul 1996). In contrast to one-worker ﬁrms, successful two-worker
ﬁrms are characterized by lower rent payments and higher worker turnover.
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Figure 5: Average eﬀort for a given wage during periods 1–7. Workers who work predomi-
nantly in one-worker ﬁrms vs. workers who work predominantly in two-worker ﬁrms during
the late phase (i.e., in more than 50% of their employment spells in periods 8–18).
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